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INTRODUCTION
Collection, analysis, and use of personal data increasingly affect
everything we do in the information age, from our personal privacy to our
opportunities for jobs, housing, travel, and health care. As algorithms for
making decisions based on this data become more powerful, so too will
the people and organizations who collect and use the data.
Reformers will press for government regulation in the name of
protecting personal privacy and preventing abuse and discrimination.
In response, businesses that collect, analyze, use, distribute, and sell
personal data will likely raise First Amendment defenses. It will only
be natural for them to try to prevent what they regard as meddlesome
and invasive government regulation by invoking the First Amendment
- one of the most central of our constitutional liberties.
These developments are part of a far larger trend in which the First
Amendment has gradually been transformed into a bulwark of
protection against business regulation. This is not the first time such a
transformation has occurred. The American Civil War was fought,
among other things, over the rights of free labor, which were then
understood as equally central to civil liberty and equality of
citizenship.' During the first Gilded Age, the right of free labor - now
reinterpreted as a right of freedom to contract - became an important
constitutional defense against new forms of economic regulation.2
The New Deal reconstituted the concept of civil liberties, and the
First Amendment rights of speech, press, and association became the
paradigmatic examples of constitutional liberty. Now, in our second
I See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970).
2 See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 26 (2004) [hereinafter
Digital Speech and Democratic Culture] ("Courts turned the ideology of free labor into
a constitutional principle of liberty of contract that prevented governments from
regulating wages and working conditions."); see, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578, 589 (1897) (holding that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment includes the right "to pursue any livelihood or avocation"
and "to enter into all contracts which may be proper" for these purposes). For
accounts of how Gilded Age ideas of freedom of contract were created out of
Jacksonian and free labor ideals, see, for example, Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire
and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 LAw & HIST. REV. 293 (1985); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities
of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Guilded Age, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 767, 798-99;
Charles W. McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract" Reconsidered: Major Premises
in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937, in YEARBOOK 1984: SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL
SOCIETY 20 (1984).
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Gilded Age, the First Amendment has become the most fertile source
of constitutional defenses to business regulation.3
I find myself on both sides of this emerging conflict. On the one
hand, I understand that human freedom in the information age
requires regulation of new forms of social and economic power, just as
it did in the first Gilded Age. On the other hand, I also believe in the
constitutional freedoms of the First Amendment. This essay attempts
to make these two commitments cohere - to show how protections of
personal privacy in the digital age can co-exist with rights to collect,
analyze, and distribute information that are protected under the First
Amendment.
In this essay, I reconcile these seemingly opposed interests through
the concept of an information fiduciary.4 This concept describes an
important category of people and businesses in the digital age. I will
argue that many online service providers and cloud companies who
collect, analyze, use, sell, and distribute personal information should be
seen as information fiduciaries toward their customers and end-users.
Because of their special power over others and their special
relationships to others, information fiduciaries have special duties to act
in ways that do not harm the interests of the people whose information
they collect, analyze, use, sell, and distribute. These duties place them in
a different position from other businesses and people who obtain and
use digital information. And because of their different position, the First
Amendment permits somewhat greater regulation of information
fiduciaries than it does for other people and entities.
Not all information fiduciaries are the same, however; the duties
they take on depend on the nature of their business and the reasonable
expectations of the public. Equally important, not everyone on the
3 Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 2, at 25 ("One of the
most important developments of the past quarter century is the emergence of the First
Amendment and the free speech principle as anti-regulatory tools for corporate
counsel."); id. at 27-28 (describing features of a Second Gilded Age, in which
"Ifireedom of speech is becoming a generalized right against economic regulation of
the information industries" and "[piroperty is becoming the right of the information
industries to control how ordinary people use digital content"); J.M. Balkin, Some
Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 375, 383-85 (predicting a "transformation" and "ideological drift" in free speech
doctrine and explaining that "[blusiness interests ... are finding that arguments for
property rights ... can more and more easily be rephrased in the language of the first
amendment by using the very same absolutist forms of argument offered by the left in
previous generations" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4 Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 5,
2014, 4:50 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-
age.html [hereinafter Information Fiduciaries].
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Internet is an information fiduciary, and the First Amendment rights
of these actors are unaffected by the analysis I offer here. My goal, in
other words, is to shift the focus of First Amendment arguments about
privacy from the kind of information to the kinds of relationships -
relationships of trust and confidence - that governments may
regulate in the interests of privacy.
The concept of information fiduciaries does not solve all of the
problems that lie at the intersection of information privacy and the
First Amendment. And it does not solve all of the problems of
overreaching that will inevitably occur in the age of Big Data. Even so,
it helps us better understand a wide range of issues. I will also point
out how the concept of information fiduciaries should cause us to
rethink some of our doctrines of Fourth Amendment law, another part
of the Constitution concerned with information privacy.
I. Two STORIES ABOUT DATA
To explain some of the central problems that digital privacy presents
for standard First Amendment doctrines, I begin with two stories. The
first is about Uber, an online car service. The second is about
Facebook, the popular social media site.
In November 2014, BuzzFeed revealed that a senior executive at
Uber, Emil Michael, was furious at the negative coverage of the
company by a journalist, Sarah Lacy. Michael suggested at a dinner -
in front of reporters no less! - that the company might hire
opposition researchers to gather and spread embarrassing details about
Lacy's personal life.5
Of course, Uber does not need to hire private investigators if it
wanted to embarrass or coerce people. It sits on a gold mine of private
information about its users. Uber knows when people take rides,
where they are coming from, where they are going to, their location
during each part of the ride, and the time the rides begin and end.
In addition, Uber executives have revealed the existence of software
features - sometimes called a "God View" - that allow real-time
tracking of drivers, of riders, and of people waiting for rides. 6 Uber has
5 Ben Smith, Uber Executive Suggests Digging Up Dirt on Journalists, BuZZFEED (Nov.
17, 2014, 5:57 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/bensmith/uber-executive-suggests-
digging-up-dirt-on-journalists.
6 Johana Bhuiyan & Charlie Warzel, "God View": Uber Investigates Its Top New York
Executive for Privacy Violations, BUZzFEED (Nov. 18, 2014, 8:27 PM), httpi/www.
buzzfeed.comfjohanabhuiyan/uber-is-investigating-its-top-new-york-executive-for-privacy;
Kashmir Hill, 'God View': Uber Allegedly Stalked Users for Party-Goers' Viewing Pleasure
(Updated), FoRBEs (Oct. 3, 2014, 11:32 AM), httpJ/www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
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strenuously denied that it is misusing this information. 7 In theory,
however, Uber might use this data in lots of different ways to
embarrass journalists, politicians, or other people who use the service.
In theory, for example, Uber could reveal information suggesting that
customers were engaged in extramarital affairs or engaged in secret or
illegal meetings that they would not want others to know about.
This is not merely speculation. An Uber executive who was meeting
with a journalist read the journalists' location logs and sent them to
her to see why she was late. The company later disciplined the
executive for the use of the data.8
Moreover, companies like Uber and the dating site OkCupid
understand that people are fascinated by Big Data and what companies
can now do with all of the data they collect. People like to hear about
all the interesting inferences that data scientists can draw about our
collective behavior. Accordingly, OkCupid has published stories about
what data tells us about users' sexual practices,9 while Uber has used
its data to print interesting stories about the people who use its
services and how they use them. For example, in a blog post entitled
"Rides of Glory," Uber explained how to use the data it collects to tell
if someone is using Uber to travel to and from a one-night stand. 10
My second story comes from Harvard's Jonathan Zittrain, and it is
about Facebook. 11 Facebook wanted to know if it could encourage
people to vote, so it decided to perform an experiment on its users.
2014/10/03/god-view-uber-allegedly-stalked-users-for-party-goers-viewing-pleasure/.
7 Bhuiyan & Warzel, supra note 6.
8 id.; Lisa Vaas, Uber: We Accessed Reporter's Private Trip Info Because She Was Late,
NAKED SECURITY (Dec. 17, 2014), https'//nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/12/17/uber-we-
accessed-reporters-private-trip-info-because-she-was-late; Letter from Katherine Tassi,
Uber Managing Counsel - Privacy, to Senator Al Franken, available at http://www.
franken.senate.gov/files/documents/141215UberResponse.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).
9 Christian Rudder, 10 Charts About Sex, OKTRENDS (Apr. 19, 2011),
http://blog.okcupid.comindex.php/10-charts-about-sex/ ("All the data below, even the
most personal stuff, has been gleaned from real user activity on OkCupid. Some of it
our users have told us outright by answering match questions; some of it we've had to
learn from observation.").
10 Derrick Harris, The One-Night Stand, Quantified and Visualized by Uber, GIGAOM
(Mar. 26, 2012, 4:05 PM PST), httpsI/gigaom.comi/2012/03/26/uber-one-night-stands/.
Uber's blog post on "Rides of Glory" has since been taken down, in the wake of the
disclosure of Uber's God View. See Chanelle Bessette, Does Uber Even Deserve Our Trust?,
FoRBEs (Nov. 25, 2014, 5:36 PM), http//www.forbes.comlsites/chanellebessette/
2014/11/25/does-uber-even-deserve-our-trust. The post, however, is still available on the
Internet Archive. Voytek, Rides of Glory, UBER BLOG (Mar. 26, 2012),
https://web.archive.org/web/20140827195715/http./blog.uber.com/ridesofglory.
11 Jonathan Zittrain, Response, Engineering an Election: Digital Gerrymandering Poses a
Threat to Democracy, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 335-36 (2014), httpJ/
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In the Facebook feeds of tens of millions of its users, the company
placed a graphic with a link for looking up the nearest place to vote,
the profile photos of up to six Facebook friends who had indicated
they had already voted, and a button for the end-user to announce that
he or she had voted. 12 The idea was to encourage people to vote by
showing them that their friends had voted. 13 Other Facebook users in
the experiment were simply shown a generic message urging them to
vote.14 Then Facebook cross-referenced its end-users' names with
publicly available voting records to measure how much the special
voting prompt increased turnout over the generic message.15
It turns out that users who were told that their friends had voted were
0.39 percent more likely to vote than those who received a generic get
out the vote message.' 6 Moreover, once they posted a message saying
that they had voted, they tended to influence their own Facebook
friends, even if the latter had not received the special message. 17 The
researchers concluded that the graphic directly added 60,000 votes that
would otherwise not have been cast, and the ripple effect may have
added an additional 280,000, for a total of 340,000 votes.' 8
Zittrain then asks: What if Facebook decided to use its power to
influence elections? Facebook can use personal data to predict who a
user is likely to support. t9 Suppose Facebook decided that it wanted a
candidate of a certain party to win, and so it sent voting prompts to
people likely to support that candidate in close races, like the Florida
race in the 2000 presidential election that was decided by a mere 537
votes. 20 Zittrain calls this practice "digital gerrymandering" and argues
that it should not be legal.2 '
Note the differences between the two stories. The danger in the
Uber story is that the company might use sensitive personal data to
harvardlawreview.org/2014/06/engineering-an-election/ [hereinafter Engineering an
Election]; Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever Finding
Out, NEw REPuauc (June 1, 2014), httpY/www.newrepublic.com/article/117878/
infornation-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering [hereinafter Facebook
Could Decide an Election].
12 Zittrain, Engineering an Election, supra note 11, at 335.
13 Id.
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embarrass or otherwise harm its users. The problem in the Facebook
story is different. Facebook is not trying to embarrass or harm its
users. It just wants to experiment on them, whether for the
advancement of science, for profit, or (potentially) for political
advantage.
How does the First Amendment fit in? Are these activities protected
because they involve the collection, analysis, use, sale, and
distribution of data?
First, consider the Uber example. Eugene Volokh has argued that
many privacy laws regulating the sale and disclosure of personal
information are unconstitutional under existing First Amendment
law.22 These privacy protections attempt to create a right to keep
people from saying things about you - especially true things. 23 Such
laws, Volokh argues, presumptively violate the First Amendment, and
we cannot escape the First Amendment by asserting that they are
merely matters of private concern. 24
If so, then Uber's disclosure of sensitive personal information about
its users might be protected by the First Amendment unless it also
attempted to threaten users or blackmail them. (Blackmail and threats,
of course, are not protected by the First Amendment.25) To be sure,
Uber might conceivably have violated the privacy tort of disclosure of
true embarrassing facts. 26 But many commentators argue that the tort
is on constitutionally shaky ground, and that its scope should be
construed as narrowly as possible to avoid serious First Amendment
problems.27 Uber might argue, accordingly, that disclosures tending to
22 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049,
1051 (2000).
23 See id. at 1050-51 ("[Tihe right to information privacy - my right to control
your communication of personally identifiable information about me - is a right to
have the government stop you from speaking about me.").
24 Id. at 1089 (arguing that the claim that governments may regulate speech of
private concern to protect information privacy "is theoretically unsound...
precedentially largely unsupported ... [and] has proven unworkable; and, if adopted,
it would strengthen the arguments for many other (in my view improper) speech
restrictions").
25 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) ("'true threats"'
unprotected); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (same).
26 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). The tort of disclosure
allows civil liability when the defendant "gives publicity to a matter concerning the
private life of another," when the "matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the
public." Id.
27 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 22, at 1088-95 (arguing that basing privacy
[Vol. 49:11831190
2016] Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment
undermine the credibility of a journalist who is criticizing Uber's
practices should be considered newsworthy and beyond the reach of
the tort.28
Companies in Uber's position can do many things short of overt
threats or blackmail that might worry people. A company like Uber
might simply want to embarrass its critics, and other people would
quickly get the message that it is unwise to cross the company. Uber
might also want to raise additional revenue by selling locational data
to other companies who want to predict consumer behavior about
things that have nothing to do with transportation services.
Volokh's argument suggests that all of these disclosures and sales
are speech about a person and that, with a few limited exceptions, the
First Amendment protects them. 29 Of course, all this assumes that the
information is true. If the information sold or disclosed to others is
false and defamatory, the answer would be different, although
companies might still be protected to some extent under the
constitutional privileges recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan30
and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.31 But privacy regulation usually seeks
to do more than prevent common-law defamation.
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. ,32 the Supreme Court struck down
regulations that sought to limit the communication and distribution of
personal data about doctors. Vermont was concerned that pharmacies
were selling information about doctor prescriptions to data miners,
who in turn sold reports about doctors' prescribing tendencies to
regulation on the identification of non-newsworthy matters of private concern is
theoretically unsound and will lead to other improper speech restrictions); Diane L.
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy
Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 294 (1983) (noting the "serious constitutional
problems" with the tort of disclosure of true private facts). Volokh points out that one
might treat differently cases of exposure - in which pictures of people are presented
naked, or on the toilet, Or in undignified situations. Volokh, supra note 22, at 1094.
28 See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998)
("[Llack of newsworthiness is an element of the 'private facts' tort," making
newsworthiness a complete bar to common law liability); cf. § 652D cmt. d (1977)
("When the subject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate public concern, there is no
invasion of privacy.").
29 Volokh, supra note 22, at 1122.
30 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that defamation against public officials is
protected unless made with actual malice).
31 418 U.S. 323, 347-49 (1974) (holding that statements of opinion are
constitutionally protected and that the New York Times privilege applies to public
officials and public figures but not to private figures).
32 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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pharmaceutical companies and their detailers (salesforce).33 The state's
concern was that allowing drug companies to target advertising at
doctors would cause doctors to prescribe more expensive drugs.34
Hence, Vermont made it illegal for pharmacists to sell information
about doctor prescriptions for marketing purposes. 35 Sorrell held the
regulation unconstitutional because it was a content-based and
speaker-based restriction on access to information and on speech
employed for marketing purposes.36 Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion pointed out that under Vermont's law, pharmacists could
donate or sell the same information to other parties for scientific,
journalistic, or other purposes.37
Justice Kennedy strongly suggests that the creation, sale, and
dissemination of personal information in the form of data can claim
protection as speech under the First Amendment.38 But he found it
unnecessary to decide the question because even if collections of data
were unprotected, Vermont's law discriminated on how people and
organizations could use the data in communications on the basis of
content and speaker.39  These restrictions violated the First
Amendment, even under the intermediate scrutiny tests used for
commercial speech.40
Next, consider Jonathan Zittrain's Facebook example. The problem
in this case is not so much that Facebook is disclosing information
about the targets of its experiment, although the company did disclose
to end-users that other Facebook friends voted. 41 Rather, the problem
is that Facebook is manipulating its end-users by dividing them into
segments and sending targeted messages to particular groups to get
them to act in certain ways. Moreover, the danger is that Facebook
33 Id. at 2659-60.
34 Id. at 2661.
35 Id. at 2662-63.
36 Id. at 2663, 2667 ("The State has imposed content- and speaker-based
restrictions on the availability and use of prescriber-identifying information. So long
as they do not engage in marketing, many speakers can obtain and use the
information. But detailers cannot.").
37 Id. at 2668.
38 Id. at 2667 ("This Court has held that the creation and dissemination of
information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.").
39 Id. (noting that because the statute involved "content- and speaker-based
restrictions on the availability and use of prescriber-identifying information .... this
case can be resolved even assuming, as the State argues, that prescriber-identifying
information is a mere commodity").
40 Id. at 2667-68.
41 Zittrain, Engineering an Election, supra note 11, at 335.
[Vol. 49:11831192
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might manipulate people based on their likely political affiliation in
order to further Facebook's interests.
But here too, we might say, all of this activity is protected by the
First Amendment. In fact, what Facebook is doing is political speech.
Urging someone to go and vote is core political speech;42 indeed, it is
about as central to the core of the First Amendment as anything else.
And urging many people to vote should be just as protected as urging
one person to vote.
If we treat what Facebook did as a scientific experiment, then it
might claim a First Amendment right to engage in the speech
necessary to perform the experiment and to collate the information
(which is available publicly) to measure the results of the experiment.
One might object that if Facebook were part of a university it might
have to bring its proposed experiment before a human subjects review
board. But Facebook is not part of a university.43
Moreover, if the real complaint is that Facebook's message urging
people to vote is selectively targeted, why should this matter from the
standpoint of the First Amendment? Much digital advertising these
days is targeted;44 people receive different messages depending on
what Facebook or Google knows about them. Surely the First
Amendment protects the right of people to choose who they will and
will not speak to. Moreover, political advertising that uses e-mail is
also regularly targeted. It does not lose First Amendment protection
for this reason. Nor can the problem be that the targeting works to the
42 See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 215, 220 (1966) (striking down
criminal ban on newspaper publishing "an editorial on election day urging people to
vote a certain way on issues submitted to them").
43 For a discussion of some of the ethical problems, see James Grimmelmann, The
Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social Media Users, 13 COLO. TECH. LJ. 219, 255-58
(2015), describing the phenomenon of "IRB Laundering," in which social scientists
can use private companies to perform experiments on human subjects without having
to conform to university regulations for human subjects research.
44 See, e.g., JOSEPH TUROW, BREAKING Up AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND THE NEW MEDIA
WORLD (1997) (offering a history of targeted advertising from the 1970s to the
beginning of the digital age); JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY You: HOW THE NEW
ADVERTISING INDUSTRY Is DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH (2011) (describing
techniques of digital marketing in the twenty-first century); As Brands Turn to Digital
Advertising to Reach the Right Audience, Focus on Validation Is Increasing, FORBES (May
5, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbespr/2015/05/05/as-brands-tum-
to-digital-advertising-to-reach-the-right-audience-focus-on-validation-is-increasing/
("Currently, 90% of companies spend at least 25% of their digital advertising budgets
on specific targets, and 43% of companies spend more than half of their budgets
reaching specific targets. Most (84%) of companies expect that investment to
increase.").
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advantage of Facebook. Targeted advertising is supposed to benefit the
commercial or political advertiser; that fact does not rob the
advertising of First Amendment protection. 45
It would seem to follow, then, that the First Amendment puts rather
strict limits on how government might regulate companies, like Uber
and Facebook, that collect large amounts of information about end-
users and then analyze, use, distribute, and sell that information to
make profits, or to gain business or political advantages.
Is this true? Is there really no way to regulate these practices
consistent with the First Amendment? Consider some possible legal
theories.
II. SOME POSSIBLE FIRST AMENDMENT SOLUTIONS
A. Distinguishing Between Collection, Analysis, Use, Disclosure, and Sale
At the outset, we should distinguish between different kinds of
information practices, each of which may be treated differently under
the First Amendment. In particular, we should distinguish (1)
collection, (2) analysis, (3) use, (4) disclosure, and (5) sale of
information.46 The Uber and Facebook stories are primarily about
disclosure and use of personal information, although these are made
possible by collection and collation. The First Amendment protects
some of these activities differently than others. In particular, privacy
regulations might face fewer First Amendment problems when they
focus on the collection and use of data rather than on the analysis,
disclosure, and sale of data that is otherwise lawfully in one's
possession.47
We should not, however, conclude too hastily that there are no First
Amendment rights to collect information. Courts are beginning to
recognize a First Amendment right to record events that take place in
public.48 Early cases have focused on citizens' rights to record police
45 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) ("ITlhat the advertiser's interest is a purely economic one ....
hardly disqualifies him from protection under the First Amendment.").
46 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1149, 1181-82 (2005) (offering a similar taxonomy).
47 See id. at 1182 (noting that collection and use rules are usually treated
differently from restrictions on disclosure and sale).
48 See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the right to make "an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included
within the First Amendment's guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of
the right to disseminate the resulting recording"); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83
1194 [Vol. 49:1183
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officers or other government officials in public settings,49 but the logic
might be extended to any events that occur in public.50 A right to
record might conceivably protect a wide range of technologies for
collection of public information, with the limiting case being
harassment and violations of the tort of intrusion on seclusion.51 As
camera-equipped drones come into common use, courts, legislators,
and regulators alike are increasingly confronted with constitutional
limits on collection of data.52
The scope of a right to record is beyond the scope of this essay. I
note merely that if there is a right to collect information in public
through digital or analogue recording, there might also be a right to
collect information in the form of data.53 Imagine that instead of Uber
or Facebook, members of the press collected the data, collated the
information, and presented the results in a newspaper account. Unless
we can come up with plausible distinctions between the right to
record data in digital form (which is what a cellphone does) and the
right to collect data, the First Amendment may treat both the same.54
(1st Cir. 2011) ("[The First Amendment protects the filming of government officials
in public spaces."); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)
("The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public
officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public
interest."). But cf. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that the right to record is not clearly established for purposes of qualified
immunity doctrine). See generally Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian
Drones and the Things They Carey, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 57, 62-63 (2013)
(discussing circuit decisions on the right to record).
49 See, e.g., Glik, 655 F.3d at 79 (recognizing right to record public officials in
public spaces); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing City of
Cumming, 212 F.3d at 1333) (noting that "videotaping or photographing the police in
the performance of their duties on public property may be a protected activity"); City
of Cumming, 212 F.3d at 1333 ("The First Amendment protects the right to gather
information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right
to record matters of public interest."); Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534,
541-42 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (basing the right to record police officers on the fact that
"[t]he activities of the police, like those of other public officials, are subject to public
scrutiny").
50 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 84-86 (2014)
(explaining why the right to collect and create information suggests a broad right to
record); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 409 (2011) ("[Tlhe First
Amendment protects the right to record images we observe as part of the right to
form, reflect upon, and share our memories.").
51 See Bambauer, supra note 50, at 63-64, 111-12; Kreimer, supra note 50, at 397-98.
52 See Kaminski, supra note 48; Kreimer, supra note 50, at 404-06.
53 For a sustained argument to this effect, see Bambauer, supra note 50, at 85.
54 See, e.g., id. at 83 ("In time, the rule that mechanically capturing information is
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The most obvious difference is that data collected on a public street
using a cell phone seems "public" and therefore part of public
discussion. By contrast, personal data collected on the Internet seems
"private" and not a contribution to public discourse. The problem I
am interested in is how to make sense of that distinction.
B. Data as Commodity or as Speech
One might argue that data, when collected, collated, used, and sold
in bulk, is not speech at all. Rather, it is a commodity, like widgets or
soybeans. Vermont made this argument in Sorrell; although the Court
did not decide the question, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
seemed skeptical. 55 Yet it is not clear that the format in which
information is delivered is the crucial distinction. If a journalist or
scientist published data in the course of a report to the public, it
should be protected speech. Instead of focusing on the form of
information as digital data, we may need to focus instead on its social
characterization or social function.
C. Privacy Regulations as Time, Place, and Manner Regulations
We might also argue that privacy regulations are content-neutral
regulations of time, place, and manner of expression. We might rely
on Bartnicki v. Vopper,56 in which both the majority and the dissent
agreed that restrictions on disclosure of intercepted material without
consent were content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations.57
Bartnicki also seems to suggest, however, that there is a right to
distribute information on matters of public concern, lawfully obtained,
to the public. 58 Hence, if one wants to control disclosure or sale, one
still has to show that the information collected in the course of
business is not a matter of public concern.59 The time, place, and
nonexpressive conduct will prove to be unworkable.").
55 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011); see also Bambauer,
supra note 50, at 71-72.
56 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
57 Id. at 526 (stating that "the communications at issue are singled out by virtue of
the fact that they were illegally intercepted - by virtue of the source, rather than the
subject matter" or the content); id. at 544 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting, joined by Scalia
& Thomas, JJ.) (agreeing that the regulations were content-neutral).
58 See id. at 535 (holding that if a reporter lawfully obtained material about a
matter of public concern, the First Amendment protects the right to communicate it
even if it was originally obtained illegally).
59 See, e.g., Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1140-41 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(noting that speech on matters of private concern may warrant less constitutional
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manner theory, in other words, does not answer the central issue: how
to distinguish between information that can be made part of public
discourse and information that can be kept out of public discourse.
Nevertheless, as Bartnicki itself suggests, once we figure out how to
define matters of private concern, the time, place, and manner
approach to privacy makes considerable sense. Moreover, it may
explain constitutional privacy regulations directed to collection or to
use rather than to sale or disclosure.
On the other hand, the time, place, and manner approach seems to
require content neutrality. First Amendment problems may arise if
governments direct privacy regulations only at particular classes of
businesses, restrict only the commercial marketing of data, or restrict
only the use of data for advertising purposes. Sorrell subjected
speaker-selective privacy regulations to heightened scrutiny; it also
held that restrictions aimed only at marketing would be vulnerable. 60
And a recent case, Reed v. Town of Gilbert,61 seems to suggest that even
innocuous subject matter restrictions may prevent municipal
regulations from being content-neutral.62
D. Commercial Speech
Still another solution would be to treat regulations of the collection,
analysis, use, disclosure, and sale of data as regulations of commercial
speech, which receives somewhat less protection than other speech.63
This approach has a superficial plausibility because it is mostly
protection and can be regulated in the interests of privacy).
60 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667.
61 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
62 Compare id. at 2228-30 (explaining that laws that distinguish among signs
based on their content, including their subject matter, are "subject to strict scrutiny
regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of
'animus toward the ideas contained' in the regulated speech" (quoting City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993))), with id. at 2236-37
(Kagan, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.) (describing wide range of
sign ordinances that are now subject to strict scrutiny under the new doctrine).
63 Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) ("Our
jurisprudence has emphasized that 'commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values,' and is subject to 'modes of regulation that might be
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression."' (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-66 (1980) (setting out a four-part test for
commercial speech regulation which imposes intermediate scrutiny and permits
regulation of misleading speech and speech which advocates illegal commercial
activity).
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commercial entities who collect, use, and sell personal data, and the
sale of data is a commercial transaction. But this is not a solution; it is
a play on words.64 Commercial speech is speech whose social function
is to encourage commercial transactions; the central example is
commercial advertising.65 The fact that a commercial entity engages in
speech does not make it commercial speech; otherwise, every article in
the New York Times would be commercial speech. And the fact that
data is bought and sold in bulk by commercial enterprises does not
make it commercial speech either. Otherwise, books and music
bought and sold in bulk by commercial enterprises would be
commercial speech.
To be sure, restrictions on the collection, analysis, use, distribution,
and sale of personal data may also violate the right to engage in
commercial speech. That is because government restrictions may
hamper the ability of businesses to target potential customers and
fashion customized messages. 66 But the more basic question is whether
the collection, analysis, use, distribution, or sale of personal data -
whether or not helpful to commercial advertising - is protected by
the First Amendment. 67
Although some personal data is sold, much of it is not; often it is
kept and used by the business that collects it, for purposes that go well
beyond advertising. For example, in the two stories that begin this
essay, Uber and Facebook were not offering to sell their data to others;
they were using the data for internal purposes. Nor were they using
the data to advertise products to their end users.68
Equally important, the commercial speech strategy is premised on
the assumption that it will be considerably easier for governments to
secure information privacy if courts treat data as commercial speech.
Yet Sorrell suggests that a majority of the Justices will offer true and
non-misleading commercial speech protection almost as great as core
political speech. 69 Thus, if the data that companies are collecting,
64 See Volokh, supra note 22, at 1080-81.
65 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976) (holding that the Constitution protects "speech which does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction' (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376,385 (1973))).
66 See U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1999)
(determining that restrictions on the sale of consumer data about telephone customers
was a restriction on commercial speech because it interfered with telephone
company's ability to target customers for advertising purposes).
67 See Bambauer, supra note 50, at 73-74.
68 See supra Part 11.
69 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663-64 (2011) (applying
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analyzing, using, and selling is accurate, calling it commercial speech
will not be of much help.
E. Contract
Eugene Volokh has argued that we can protect privacy by private
ordering through contract.70 Parties can agree contractually to
information privacy rules. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.71 suggests that
contracts not to disclose are enforceable, even against journalists who
are engaged in core exercises of protected speech. Cowles Media applied
promissory estoppel against a journalist who caused a source to rely on
his assertion that he would not disclose the source's identity. 72
Volokh's point is that although the state may not be able to keep
you from saying things to others that you do not like, it can enforce
private contracts that achieve the same goal.73 To the extent that
companies promise not to collect, analyze, use, sell, or disclose
personal data in particular ways, the First Amendment will not protect
them if they violate their promises. Thus, we can hold companies like
Uber or Facebook to the terms of the privacy policies stated in their
end-user license agreement or terms of service.
However, the flip side of the contract theory is that if there is no
contract (or reliance-inducing promise), there is no constitutionally
enforceable privacy right. And because companies like Uber and
Facebook can state their privacy policies in vague terms, or change
their privacy policies more or less at will, relying on terms of service
or end user license agreements may offer only very limited privacy
protections.
The contractual solution to the balance between First Amendment
and privacy regulation is similar to a property model of privacy. The
contract solution treats personal privacy as an entitlement that end-
users may consent to surrender or transfer to companies, with the
default rule being that in the absence of an agreed-to privacy policy,
consumers have no right to control information that they have
voluntarily provided to companies. The First Amendment then
respects the result of whatever bargain is reached.
"heightened judicial scrutiny" to Vermont's law because it made content- and speaker-
based distinctions); id. at 2677-79 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg & Kagan,
Ji.) (arguing that majority has imported features of First Amendment doctrine that
apply to core speech into commercial speech doctrine).
70 Volokh, supra note 22, at 1057-63.
71 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
72 Id. at 668-72.
73 See Volokh, supra note 22, at 1057-58, 1061-62.
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Many privacy scholars have pointed out that relying solely on this
approach to privacy protection will seriously under-protect people's
privacy. People are not very good at privacy management; they do not
understand the cumulative effects of their agreements to allow
collection, analysis, use, and sale of information about them.74
Moreover, Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog have pointed out
that "contract law - formal contract and promissory estoppel - plays
hardly any role in the protection of information privacy, at least vis-A-
vis websites with privacy policies." 75 Attempts to use privacy policies
to protect consumer privacy have generally met with failure, and
much consumer privacy regulation has fallen to administrative
agencies like the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").76
F. The Limits of the Contractual Model
The contract model has other shortcomings. Paul Schwartz has
pointed out that it does not seem to account for widely accepted
privacy practices in highly regulated areas like health care.77 How does
one explain, for example, the traditional duties of confidentiality
between doctors and patients, the increasingly elaborate privacy
regulations of electronic patient records, or the fracturing of health
care services into multiple institutions? Modern health care privacy
law is largely a set of government created regulations, rather than a
result of private ordering.78
74 See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. LJ. 1131, 1149
(2011) ("Many consumers have little idea how much of their information they are
giving up or how it will be used."); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1502 (2000) ("[Clonsumers suffer from privacy myopia: they will
sell their data too often and too cheaply."); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:
Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393,
1452 (2001) ("It is difficult for the individual to adequately value specific pieces of
personal information."). Information and learning costs often deter effective
contracting. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles,
in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE "INFORMATION ECONOMY" 341, 360-61
(Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (noting that privacy policies are often difficult to understand
and therefore most Americans do not read them).
75 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 596 (2014).
76 Id. at 596-97.
77 Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh's First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1565-66 (2000) (noting that freedom
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Volokh offers a possible solution: he suggests that implied contracts
for privacy should be as enforceable as explicit contracts. 79 He argues
that doctors and patients, even without explicitly making promises, or
entering into negotiations, reasonably expect that patient information
will be kept confidential because of customary practice.80 In this way
one might bring traditional doctor-patient and lawyer-client
relationships within the contractual model.
Yet this does not really solve the problem. First, customs can and do
change over time, and they change when people explicitly reject or alter
them. Thus, a theory of implied contract does not protect people if
doctors specifically alter patient expectations by announcing that patients
should not expect that their information will be kept confidential.8 ' There
are good reasons why doctors may not do this (which I will discuss
momentarily), but they are more about tort than contract.
Second, in modern health care, patients have relationships not only
with their doctors but with a wide range of institutions, from hospitals
to health maintenance organizations to insurers, and it is difficult to
see how one could plausibly describe privacy obligations in terms of
implied contracts with all of them. Indeed, patients may not have any
contracts or agreements with some of them.82
Third, to the extent that the implied contract theory depends on
well-understood and longstanding customs that generate reasonable
expectations of how health care professionals and patients will
interact, it is unlikely to be helpful in deciding how and whether to
extend privacy protections to new kinds of health care providers or
entities that collect and process health care records.83 Indeed, as noted
above, health care privacy is primarily regulated by public law, not
contract law; governments impose health privacy regulations on many
79 Volokh, supra note 22, at 1057-58 ("In many contexts, people reasonably
expect - because of custom, course of dealing with the other party, or all the other
factors that are relevant to finding an implied contract - that part of what their
contracting partner is promising is confidentiality." (footnote omitted)).
8o Id.
81 Volokh argues that "a legislature may indeed enact a law stating that certain
legislatively identified transactions should be interpreted as implicitly containing a
promise of confidentiality." But this only acts as a default rule, and would not apply if
"such a promise is explicitly and prominently disclaimed by the offeror, and the
contract together with the disclaimer is accepted by the offeree." Volokh, supra note
22, at 1060.
82 Schwartz, supra note 77, at 1565-67; see Volokh, supra note 22, at 1059-60
(noting difficulty of assessing expectations of confidentiality in a wide range of
situations).
83 See Schwartz, supra note 77, at 1566-67.
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different kinds of actors, as the federal government does in the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA")84 and other
statutes. The contractual model would place all of these arrangements
- even the most sensible - in jeopardy of constitutional challenge.
The contractual model of privacy protection, in short, begs some of the
most important questions about privacy regulation. For example, the
state might decide that businesses should have certain kinds of privacy
policies; or it might add or imply privacy guarantees in contracts between
businesses and end-users.85 Sometimes the state might impose privacy
protections as default rules; but sometimes it might impose terms that the
parties cannot easily contract around. A contract model suggests that
some or all of these practices may be vulnerable under the First
Amendment, at least to the extent that the parties have not explicitly or
implicitly agreed to these state-mandated terms.86
Indeed, a contractual model of privacy has an interesting feature. It
tends to conflate First Amendment freedom with contractual freedom.
Conversely, it creates potential First Amendment problems for all forms
of state privacy regulation that cannot be cashed out in terms of enforcing
private contracts. To the extent that information privacy regulation is
achieved through private contract, it is presumptively constitutional
under the First Amendment. But if the state attempts to regulate
information privacy contracts by rewriting important terms, or by
imposing unwaivable duties, the regulation may be constitutionally
suspect under the First Amendment. 87 In this way, the contract model
84 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
85 To give only one recent example, in September 2014, California enacted the
Student Online Personal Information Protection Act ("SOPIPA"), which restricts how
Internet and cloud-based sites, applications, and services designed for K-12
educational purposes can use student data; and prevents these entities from selling,
using, or distributing student data for targeted marketing purposes. See Student
Online Personal Information Protection Act (SOPIPA), CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
22584(a)-(b)(4) (2016).
86 See Volokh, supra note 22, at 1061-62 (describing limits of contractual
approach). Volokh does not claim that contractual approaches to privacy will give
privacy advocates everything they would like. His point, rather, is that "contractual
solutions are a constitutional alternative and may be the only constitutional
alternative, not that they are always a particularly satisfactory alternative." Id. at 1062.
87 For example, in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress imposed a duty
of "confidentiality of proprietary information of, and relating to, other
telecommunication carriers, equipment manufacturers, and customers." 47 U.S.C. §
222(a) (2012). Congress permitted carriers to use customer information within the
confines of the existing service relationship, but prohibited carriers from otherwise
using, disclosing or allowing access to such information "[eixcept as required by law
or with the approval of the customer." Id. § 222(c)(1).
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brings back Lochnerian premises in an unexpected way. By connecting
the boundaries of what the First Amendment permits and forbids to the
exercise of contractual liberties, it in effect turns First Amendment
protections into protections of freedom of contract.
A 1999 decision, U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC,88 offers an example. In the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress directed
telecommunications facilities to protect consumer privacy. 89 In order
to enforce Congress's mandate, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") issued regulations concerning the collection and
sale of customer proprietary network information ("CPNI") - that is,
data about consumers' activities on the phone network.90 The FCC
imposed "opt-in" rules, which assumed that consumers wanted
privacy protection, and therefore required express prior customer
consent for most carrier uses of consumer data.91 U.S. West preferred
an "opt-out" rule, which allowed it to use and sell the data unless the
consumer expressly said "no."92 The 10th Circuit agreed with U.S.
West that attempting to shift the default rule violated the First
Amendment.93 On remand, the Commission adopted more lenient
"opt-out" rules, which allowed carriers to use CPNI in most instances,
provided that customers received notice in advance and had an
opportunity to refuse consent or "opt out."94
U.S. West is not the last word. In 2009, in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC,95 the D.C. Circuit upheld new FCC
rules that imposed opt-in requirements against a First Amendment
challenge. 96 It assumed that Congress could constitutionally impose a
88 U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
89 See supra note 87.
90 U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1228 & n.1.
91 See id. at 1230.
92 See id. at 1240, 1246-47 (Briscoe,J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 1239 (majority opinion) ("Even assuming that telecommunications
customers value the privacy of CPNI, the FCC record does not adequately show that
an opt-out strategy would not sufficiently protect customer privacy.").
94 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 555 F.3d 996, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(summarizing FCC rulemaking following U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th
Cir. 1999)).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 999-1000 (upholding 2007 rules that required carriers "obtain opt-in
consent from a customer before disclosing that customer's [informationi to a carrier's
joint venture partner or independent contractor for the purpose of marketing
communications-related services to that customer" (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). In an earlier case involving the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
the D.C. Circuit also held that opt-out rules were not required by the First
Amendment as a less restrictive alternative to regulation of commercial speech. See
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duty on telecommunications carriers to protect the privacy of their
customers, and it held that opt-in rules were a reasonable means of
achieving consumer privacy.97
These two privacy cases exemplify a basic problem for contractual
models of privacy. Contractual models require a fairly administrable
distinction between contractual protections of privacy - which,
generally speaking, do not raise First Amendment problems - and
tort causes of action for invasion of privacy - which often do. 98 The
difficulty, as every professor of private law knows, is that the
boundaries between contract and tort are fuzzy.
Governments may want to protect consumer privacy by adding
default rules, implying duties, and adding state-imposed terms and
obligations to consumer privacy contracts. Shifting entitlements
through default rules may be acceptable under the contractual model
if the default rules are clearly stated at the outset and easy to contract
out of.99 But the more difficult it becomes to change privacy
protections by contract, the more the contractual obligation looks like
a tort duty imposed by the state. And when the state imposes non-
waivable duties - by statute or by administrative regulation - it is
essentially offering a tort theory of privacy protection. Then the
contractual theory of privacy protection will not be of much help.00 In
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n, the D.C. Circuit upheld
statutory and administrative privacy regulations against First
Amendment challenge by treating the sale of consumer data as
commercial speech and then holding that the regulations passed
intermediate scrutiny.' 01 But, as noted above, although data may help
Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 811, 818-19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding
FTC enforcement pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act that limits the ability of
companies to sell lists of names and addresses of consumers to target marketers).
97 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 555 F.3d at 1000-02.
98 See Volokh, supra note 22, at 1061 (noting that the disclosure tort cannot be
justified under the contract theory); see also Fla. Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533
(1989) (holding that a state may not punish publication of "lawfully obtainled]
truthful information about a matter of public significance... absent a need to further
a state interest of the highest order" (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S.
97, 103 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
99 See Volokh, supra note 22, at 1060 (noting that shifting defaults may be
constitutional under these conditions).
100 Id. at 1061 ("Cohen v. Cowles Media cannot validate speech-restrictive terms that
the government compels a party to include in a contract; the case at most validates
government-specified defaults that apply unless the offeror makes clear that these
terms aren't part of the offered deal.").
101 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 555 F.3d at 1000-02; see also Trans Union
Corp., 245 F.3d at 818-19.
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advertisers engage in commercial speech, the sale and distribution of
the underlying data is not really commercial speech.' 0 2
III. INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES
I certainly do not mean to suggest that we should simply give up on
all of the approaches I have just described. We may be able to modify
or elaborate some of them so that they offer an appropriate level of
privacy protection. But in this essay, I want to suggest another way of
approaching the problem - through the idea of fiduciary duties. The
idea of fiduciary duties gives us a way out of the neo-Lochnerian
model that binds First Amendment freedoms to contractual freedom.
It also offers us a way of explaining why certain kinds of information
are matters of private concern that governments can protect through
reasonable regulation.' 03 My central point is that certain kinds of
information constitute matters of private concern not because of their
content, but because of the social relationships that produce them. 04
Suppose that a doctor, lawyer, or accountant sold personal
information about their clients to a data broker. Suppose that they
used personal information to manipulate a client's actions for the
doctor, lawyer, or accountant's benefit. Or suppose that they simply
disclosed it in order to gain a business advantage at the expense of
their client. If they did any of these things, they would likely be liable
for a violation of professional conduct, which courts might
characterize either as a breach of a duty of professional obligations or
as professional malpractice.105 These torts normally occur in the
102 See supra text accompanying notes 63-69.
103 See, e.g., supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing Bartnicki v.
Vopper).
104 This builds on an important point about the contractual model that people may
overlook. What the contractual model gets right is that what makes privacy
obligations enforceable notwithstanding the First Amendment is not the content of
the speech but a legally enforceable social relationship; namely, contract. But other
kinds of legally enforceable social relationships - namely, fiduciary relationships -
may have the same effect.
105 Some courts and commentators treat a breach of professional or fiduciary duty
(which includes a duty of confidentiality) as a tort separate from professional
malpractice, arguing that malpractice primarily concerns duties of care, whereas
breach of fiduciary duty is primarily about a duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Beverly Hills
Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, 717 A.2d 724, 730 (Conn. 1998) (pointing out that
professionals' fiduciary obligations include more than simply exercising due care in
delivering professional services, because professionals also owe a duty of loyalty to
their clients); Caroline Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 557, 565-66 (2009) (arguing that although "[pirofessional
malpractice is ... a kind of breach of fiduciary duty," the law should recognize a
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context of contractual relationships, but the duty at stake is a tort duty
- a failure to take appropriate care toward the patient or client, or a
failure to act in the interests of the patient or client. 06
Although professional malpractice and professional breach of duty
normally arise out of a contract, courts regularly enforce tort duties
that do not have to be spelled out in a contract or explicitly agreed to
by the parties; they also award tort damages. 107 That is also true with
respect to duties about information. Even absent an express promise
not to reveal, use, or sell information, there is a duty not to do so in
separate cause of action for betrayal of trust); Dayna Bowen Matthew, Implementing
American Health Care Reform: The Fiduciary Imperative, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 715, 732-34
(2011) (distinguishing duty not to act negligently from duty of loyalty).
On the other hand, some courts have held that suing a doctor for breach of fiduciary
duty is simply duplicative of a malpractice claim because fiduciary obligations are
already part of professional obligations. See Neade ex rel. Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d
496, 503 (I1. 2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 cmt.
c (2000) ("Many claims brought by clients against lawyers can reasonably be classified
either as for breach of fiduciary-duty or for negligence without any difference in
result."); Forell & Sortun, supra, at 565 n.34.
Still other courts treat malpractice as a catch-all term for separate causes of action.
See, e.g., Smith v. Mehaffy, 30 P.3d 727, 733 (Colo. App. 2000) ("Legal malpractice is
a generic term for at least three distinct causes of action available to clients who suffer
damages because of their lawyers' misbehavior .... (1) [Bireach of contract, (2)
breach of fiduciary duty, or (3) negligence.").
106 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (2000) ("[A]
lawyer is civilly liable to a client if the lawyer breaches a fiduciary duty to the client.");
id. § 53 cmt. g; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A cmt. b (1965) (explaining
that tort duty to exercise reasonable care "applies to any person who undertakes to
render services to another in the practice of a profession, such as that of physician or
surgeon, dentist, pharmacist, oculist, attorney, accountant, or engineer"); see also Ray
Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer
on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. Rev. 235, 241-42 (1994) (noting that
although fiduciary relationships may arise in contract, the law enforces them through
stricter fiduciary standards); id. at 245-46 (explaining that the law of malpractice and
other fiduciary obligations add tort-like duties to relationships that begin as
contracts); cf. TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 240-41 (2011) (arguing that fiduciary
duties should be understood as distinct from ordinary tort obligations but that they
have important similarities, including non-waivable duties and remedies that go
beyond contract damages).
107 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 & cmt. b (1979) (explaining that
"[a] fiduciary who commits a breach of his duty as a fiduciary is guilty of tortious
conduct to the person for whom he should act" and is subject to tort damages in
addition to restitutionary or other remedies); sources cited supra note 106; cf. Daniel
Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis of Fiduciary
Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 209, 209-10 (Andrew S.
Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (noting that, unlike in contract, the law rejects the
notion of efficient breach of fiduciary duties, and permits the award of punitive
damages).
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ways that will harm the interests of the client or that pose a conflict of
interest between the professional and the patient or client. 08
Why do the parties not have to spell out their obligations through
contract in these relationships? The implied contract theory does not
really answer this question; it simply asserts that there are implied
terms that emerge from unstated or customary obligations. But where
do these obligations come from in the first place? Equally important,
why do they sometimes allow recovery of tort damages rather than
more limited contractual damages? The answer is that doctors,
lawyers, and accountants have special relationships of trust and
confidence with their clients. These are fiduciary relationships. 109
Generally speaking, a fiduciary is one who has special obligations of
loyalty and trustworthiness toward another person. The fiduciary must
take care to act in the interests of the other person, who is sometimes
called the principal, the beneficiary, or the client. The client puts their
trust or confidence in the fiduciary, and the fiduciary has a duty not to
betray that trust or confidence. 110
Fiduciaries often perform professional services or else manage
money or property for their principals, beneficiaries, or clients. In
almost every case, however, fiduciaries also handle sensitive personal
information. That is because, at their core, fiduciary relationships are
relationships of trust and confidence that involve the use and
exchange of information.
Fiduciaries have two basic duties. The first is a duty of care. The
fiduciary must take care to act competently and diligently so as not to
108 See, e.g., MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, MEDICAL
LIABILITY AND TREATMENT RELATIONSHIPS 171 (3d ed. 2013) (collecting cases on duties
of patient confidentiality); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS §§ 16, 49, 60 (2000) (stating lawyers' fiduciary duties to respect client
confidences and to act in the client's interests); Janet Leach Richards & Sheryl Wolf,
Medical Confidentiality and Disclosure of Paternity, 48 S.D. L. REV. 409, 413 & n.20
(2003) (collecting cases which hold that "that a patient can recover damages for a
breach of a physician's duty of confidentiality").
109 See FRANKEL, supra note 106, at 42-45; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 874 reporter's note (1979) ("One breach of fiduciary duty that is more commonly
regarded as giving rise to an action in tort is the disclosure of confidential
information." (citations omitted)).
110 See, e.g., Kurtz v. Solomon, 656 N.E.2d 184, 190 (I1. App. Ct. 1995) ("A
fiduciary relationship exists when one person places trust and confidence in another
who, as a result, gains influence and superiority over the other."); Deborah A. DeMott,
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE LJ. 879, 882
(explaining that fiduciaries "must be loyal to the interests of the other person" and
that "the fiduciary's duties go beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to
act to further the beneficiary's best interests").
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harm the interests of the principal, beneficiary, or client."' The
second, and in many ways more important duty, is the duty of loyalty.
Fiduciaries must keep their clients' interests in mind and act in their
clients' interests. 112 As a result, fiduciaries also have a duty not to
create potential or actual conflicts of interest that might undermine
their duties of loyalty and lead them to undermine the interests of
their clients. 113
Relationships of trust and confidence are often centrally concerned
with the collection, analysis, use, and disclosure of information. 14
Lawyers and doctors, who act under a duty of confidentiality, often
obtain information that would be very embarrassing to their clients or
might be used to their disadvantage. So, in general, the duties of a
fiduciary include duties not to use information obtained in the course
of the relationship in ways that harm or undermine the principal,
patient, or client, or create conflicts of interest with the principal,
patient, or client. 115
Put differently, professionals like doctors and lawyers have fiduciary
obligations that give them special duties with respect to personal
information that they obtain in the course of their relationships with
their clients. Therefore, we can give them a special name. We can call
them information fiduciaries.
II1 FRANKEL, supra note 106, at 169-72; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §
8.08 (2006) ("[Ain agent has a duty to the principal to act with the care, competence,
and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar circumstances."); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A & cmt. b (1965) (describing tort duty to
exercise the customary care of persons in a given profession).
112 FRANKEL, supra note 106, at 4, 106-08; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 8.01 (2006) ("An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit
in all matters connected with the agency relationship."); see also Deborah A. DeMott,
Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences,
48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 936-37 (2006) (arguing that a justified expectation of loyalty is
the characteristic feature of all fiduciary relationships).
113 FRANKEL, supra note 106, at 108.
114 See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1283, 1308-10 (2000) (arguing for basing privacy law on breach of trust); Neil M.
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, STAN. TECH. L.
REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6-7), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2655719 (arguing that privacy law should be grounded in
concepts of trust in the use of information similar to fiduciary law).
115 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006) ("An agent has a duty ...
(2) not to use or communicate confidential information of the principal for the agent's
own purposes or those of a third party."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 16, 49, 60 (2000) (stating lawyers' fiduciary duties to respect
client confidences); HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 108, at 171 (stating
fiduciary duties of physicians).
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An information fiduciary is a person or business who, because of
their relationship with another, has taken on special duties with
respect to the information they obtain in the course of the
relationship.116 People and organizations that have fiduciary duties
arising from the use and exchange of information are information
fiduciaries whether or not they also do other things on the client's
behalf, like manage an estate or perform legal or medical services.
Because most professional relationships are fiduciary relationships,
most professionals are also information fiduciaries. And that means, in
particular, that professionals have duties to use the information they
obtain about their clients for the client's benefit and not to use the
information to the client's disadvantage.
Fiduciary duties are, generally speaking, duties of trust. In fact, the
term "fiduciary" comes from the Latin word for "trust;" and there is a
similar connection between the words "confidentiality" and
"confidence," or trust in another.117 In fact, the idea of an information
fiduciary is related to the law of confidentiality. Neil Richards and Dan
Solove have argued that we should expand the common law of
confidentiality, which recognizes a tort for breach of confidentiality
when a person violates a relationship of trust with another.118 The
proposed Restatement of Data Privacy Principles recognizes a duty to
maintain confidentiality where there is an "express or implied promise
of confidentiality" or in light of relevant "ethical standards."'119
IV. FIDUCIARIES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
How does the idea of an information fiduciary interact with the First
Amendment? Does being an information fiduciary affect one's free
speech rights? Yes, it does. The First Amendment treats information
practices by fiduciaries very differently than it treats information
practices involving relative strangers.
Suppose that you are a gynecologist, and in the course of your
practice, you learn all sorts of interesting things about your patients,
including the crazy things your patients say to you. You decide to
comment on what you have learned by making a work of art,
116 Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 4.
117 See also Fiduciary, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); ADOLF BERGER,
ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAw 471-72 (1953).
118 Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. LJ. 123, 156-58, 182 (2007); see also Litman, supra note 114,
at 1308-10 (arguing for breach of trust and breach of confidence as the basis of
information privacy law); Richards & Hartzog, supra note 114.
119 RESTATEMENT OF DATA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES § 5 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2014).
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appropriately entitled, "Crazy Stuff My Patients Say." You create an art
installation at a contemporary art museum. It features a rotating
cylinder with flashing lights on which are projected pictures of your
patients, and quotes of interesting things that patients have said to you
in the course of your practice; surrounding the cylinder, encased in
plastic, are copies of case histories and medical reports. You present
this to the public as a work of art that offers a profound commentary
on the state of medicine and the nature of the human body in the
twenty-first century.
Your patients are understandably annoyed to see themselves featured
in your art, and they sue you for malpractice or for breach of a
professional (fiduciary) duty. You defend yourself on the grounds that
you are an artist, and you point out that your work, like the best
contemporary art, is designed to be transgressive. Yet the fact that you
are an artist, who makes amazing works of art with your patients'
personal data and medical records, would probably not be a sufficient
defense in a tort action for malpractice or breach of professional duty. 120
Why is this? Well, you are using sensitive information to your
advantage and to the disadvantage of your patients. Generally
speaking, when the law prevents a fiduciary from disclosing or selling
information about a client - or using information to a client's
disadvantage - this does not violate the First Amendment, even
though the activity would be protected if there were no fiduciary
relationship.
To explain why this is so, I will borrow an idea from my friend and
colleague, Dean Robert Post. Post points out that our First
Amendment jurisprudence gives special protection to what he calls
public discourse.121 Public discourse refers to the processes of
communication through which ideas and opinions circulate in a
community to produce public opinion.' 22
120 See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (holding a psychiatrist
liable for breach of duty of confidentiality for republishing parts of a patient's analysis
in a book); see also Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 829-30 (Ala. 1973) (recognizing
physician's duty not to disclose information obtained in course of patient's treatment);
Cannell v. Med. & Surgical Clinic, 315 N.E.2d 278, 280 (I1. App. Ct. 1974) (same);
McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431,439 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (same).
121 Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REV.
601, 637-38 (1990) (defining public discourse as "critical interaction" between
members of a community and noting that "[clontemporary constitutional doctrine
looks to this debate to constitute that 'universe of discourse' within which public
opinion, and hence democratic policy, may be formed").
122 See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE
[Vol. 49:11831210
2016] Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment
Post and I have slightly different views about why public discourse
receives special constitutional protection. He argues that the
Constitution protects public discourse because it promotes democratic
legitimacy. For government to be responsive to its citizens, it must
respect the free circulation of ideas and opinions.123
I agree that this is one reason why we value public discourse, but it
is not the only one. Most of what people discuss in public discourse is
not especially political. They discuss celebrities, sports, popular
entertainment, art, and music, and they talk about their relationships
with others and their personal lives. These discussions are very
important to people; more important, in some cases, than their views
on electoral politics or public policy. People are social creatures, and
they become who they are through conversation, through absorbing
popular art and culture, and through being influenced by the ideas
and opinions of the people around them.
People influence and reshape each other over time by living and
participating in cultures of belief and opinion, and so these cultures
have significant power over people. Cultures often feature powerful
institutions and practices that produce and reproduce beliefs and
opinions. People have a right to participate in forms of power that
reshape and alter them because what is literally at stake is their own
selves. The central way that people participate in the formation of
cultures of belief and opinion is through freedom of expression
(including associated freedoms like those of press, assembly, and
association).
In a free society, even in one that is not perfectly democratic, or
even democratic at all, people should have the right to participate in
the forms of meaning-making that shape who they are and that also
help constitute them as individuals, whether or not their speech has
much of a connection to politics.1 24 For this reason, I argue that the
CONSTITUTION 49 (2014) [hereinafter CITIZENS DIVIDED] ("I shall use the term public
discourse to describe the communicative processes by which persons participate in the
formation of public opinion."); ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 15 (2012)
[hereinafter DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM] (same).
123 POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED, supra note 122, at 49-50 (explaining that the First
Amendment's protection of the right of participation in public discourse underwrites
citizens' belief that their government is responsive to them); Robert Post, The
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) ("Public
discourse is comprised of those processes of communication that must remain open to
the participation of citizens if democratic legitimacy is to be maintained.").
124 Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 Nw. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 10), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
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First Amendment protects the right to participate in the formation of
culture as well as in political discourse. The First Amendment, in
other words, protects cultural democracy as well as political
democracy.125 Indeed, political democracy is made possible by the
institutions of cultural democracy.
Meaning-making through cultural participation and comment, as
well as mutual influence through the circulation of opinions, long
predated the rise of modern democracies, and so its value is not
limited to supporting democratic legitimacy. Moreover, in the digital
age, cultural participation is not limited to national boundaries, and in
fact, it does not respect national boundaries. So the right to participate
in culture has an importance and a value that transcends legitimating
political power within a single state. To be sure, Post is correct that
the right to participate in culture through public discourse is
necessary to produce the kind of public opinion that could legitimate a
democratic state, but this right has independent constitutional value.
Thus, the right of freedom of expression is not only the right to
participate in democracy, but also the right to participate in a
democratic culture. 126
The differences between Post's formulation and mine do not matter
significantly for purposes of this essay. Under either account, what the
First Amendment principally protects is our ability to participate in
the formation of public opinion through expressing our ideas, beliefs,
and opinions to each other. Freedom of speech gives human beings
the right to have a say in the forms of cultural power that shape them
and the forms of state power that govern them.
Under either account, many kinds of speech acts are not part of public
discourse. They are not attempts to participate in the formation of public
opinion by exchanging ideas, beliefs, and opinions. Instead, they are
forms of market behavior that use speech. Therefore, states may regulate
the speech involved in them.127 For example, people use speech to form
contracts (or to refuse to form contracts). In doing so, they are not
engaged in public discourse, even though the speech occurs in public.
papers.cfm?abstract id=2676027; see Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture,
supra note 2, at 3-4, 35-37.
125 Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, supra note 124, at 9-10;
Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 2, at 3-4, 35-37.
126 Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, supra note 124, at 10;
Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 2, at 3-4, 35-37.
127 Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith's First Amendment, 128 HARV. L.
REv. F. 165, 179 (2015), available at http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/adam-
smiths-first-amendment/.
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Hence, the state can regulate what people say to each other as they form
(or refuse to form) contracts, as it does in antitrust law, consumer
protection law, and antidiscrimination law. For the same reason,
government can regulate the warnings and information that companies
put on product labels that are read by members of the general public.
And financial prospectuses for publicly traded companies are not part of
public discourse, even though the companies are publicly traded.128
Therefore, without falling afoul of the First Amendment, governments
can regulate contracts to prevent discrimination and unfair business
practices; they can require companies to label their products and make
disclosures to protect consumers; and they can require companies to
disclose information about themselves and about their operations in
order to protect investors.
Commercial speech is a special case. Like contractual speech, it is a
form of market behavior. Its social function is to induce people to buy
goods and services. But unlike the speech involved in bargaining over
contracts, commercial speech actively tries to reshape popular culture
in order to sell products and services. It does so by providing
information, ideas, images, and opinions to the general public,
attempting to reshape people's self-image, beliefs and desires.129
Commercial speech, in other words, is market behavior that attempts
to alter public culture to facilitate itself. The hybrid nature of
commercial speech - as affecting public opinion but not participating
in public discourse - shapes the distinctive way that the First
Amendment treats it.
Constitutional doctrine does not treat advertisers as attempting to
participate in public discourse. Rather, it views advertisers as adding
information that might be valuable to people who are participating in
public discourse. As the Court explained in Central Hudson, "[tihe
First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the
informational function of advertising." 130 Thus, the First Amendment
focuses not on the right of the advertiser to speak but on the right of
the public to receive the advertiser's information. 131
128 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1777-84 (2004) (noting
large swaths of business regulation, including labor law, antitrust law and securities
regulation, that remain largely outside the coverage of the First Amendment).
129 See Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, supra note 124, at 50-51.
130 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
131 Post & Shanor, Adam Smith's First Amendment, supra note 127, at 172 (noting
that the Supreme Court "explicitly created commercial speech doctrine to protect the
rights of listeners rather than the autonomy of speakers"); Post, The Constitutional
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If the First Amendment treated advertisers as contributing to public
discourse, courts would protect the right of advertisers to speak in the
same way that they protect politicians who shade the truth or mislead
their audiences. 132 But because the First Amendment focuses on the
right of the public to receive information, the rules are quite different.
Advertising information is valuable to the public to the extent that it is
true (or at least not misleading). Therefore, governments must protect
truthful, non-misleading commercial speech; but, at the same time,
governments may also require advertisers to alter or supplement their
advertisements to inform consumers or to avoid misleading them.1 33
As the examples of contractual and commercial speech demonstrate,
what falls within public discourse and what falls outside of it does not
depend on the content of the speech. Rather, it depends on a
characterization of social relationships. It depends on our
understanding of social function and on what people are doing when
they communicate with each other. In First Amendment law, deciding
whether regulation of communication is content-neutral or content-
based is often less important than deciding how to characterize the
social relationships in which communication occurs. 134
When people engage in public discourse, either as speakers or as
audiences, the law presumes that they are free, independent, and
autonomous, even if they are really not.135 Hence, it does not allow
Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 123, at 14-15 (noting that the Supreme
Court's analysis has been "audience oriented").
132 Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (applying strict scrutiny to
strike down federal law that criminalized falsely claiming to have been awarded
military honors).
133 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985) ("Because the extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the
information such speech provides, appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal." (citation
omitted)).
134 Moreover, it also matters how the state characterizes speech. If the state treats
and regulates market behavior as public discourse, courts should apply the traditional
rules that apply to public discourse. Thus, if governments treated commercial
advertisements differently because of their political message, courts should apply strict
scrutiny. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388-89 (1992) ("[A] State may
not prohibit only that commercial advertising that depicts men in a demeaning
fashion.").
135 "False ideas," Robert Post explains, "are not constitutionally recognized as
causing harm within public discourse because persons within that discourse are
presumed to be autonomous and independent." Robert C. Post, Response, Reply to
Bender, 29 ARiz. ST. L.J. 495, 499 (1997). On the other hand, "false ideas are deemed
capable of causing compensable harms within doctor-patient relationships because
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paternalistic restrictions on the dissemination of ideas and opinions,
even though it is entirely predictable that some people, perhaps many,
will be deceived or confused. All persons (or at the very least, all adults)
are treated as equally competent and equally able to fend for themselves
in the realm of public discourse. Therefore, even if speech misleads or
harms people, the First Amendment normally protects it. 136
But when people engage in speech that is not characterized as part
of public discourse, the First Amendment treats their behavior quite
differently. Outside of the realm of public discourse, the law drops its
assumption that everyone is equally able, independent, and
knowledgeable, and that everyone can equally fend for themselves. 137
This is another way of seeing why advertisers are not participating
in public discourse, even though they are surely trying to shape public
opinion. The First Amendment allows governments to assume that
consumers may not be able to assess market risks without compelled
disclosures and prohibitions on misleading advertisements.
This distinction is especially important in the context of economic
and professional transactions. The law often treats people as
potentially uninformed, vulnerable, and dependent in many economic
and professional relationships, even when these relationships involve
speech. In fact, many economic and professional transactions not only
involve speech, they would be impossible without speech. Imagine a
stock market where no one could communicate prices or a hospital
where doctors and patients could say nothing to each other. Friedrich
Hayek's famous defense of markets is that they are dispersed social
arrangements for exchanging information.138 The idea of economic
activity depends on the circulation, use, and communication of
information. But economic activity is not public discourse in the First
persons in that context are presumed to be trusting and dependent." Id.
136 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011) ("As a Nation we have
chosen a different course - to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure
that we do not stifle public debate.").
137 POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 122, at 23
("Whereas within public discourse the political imperatives of democracy require that
persons be regarded as equal and as autonomous, outside public discourse the law
commonly regards persons as dependent, vulnerable, and hence unequal.").
138 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526 (1945)
("[I1n a system where the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many
people, prices can act to co6rdinate the separate actions of different people in the
same way as subjective values help the individual to co6rdinate the parts of his
plan.").
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Amendment sense. Otherwise, all economic transactions involving
speech would be constitutionally protected. 139
For the same reason, the speech that occurs in fiduciary
relationships is not public discourse. When law regulates professional
relationships with clients in fields like law or medicine, it often
regulates the way that professionals speak to clients and requires that
they not use client information against the client's interest.140 The law
characterizes the social function of speech in these relationships as
importantly different from the expression and circulation of opinions
in the public sphere. In fiduciary relationships, the fiduciary
communicates with a person who seeks special services (often
professional services) and who is made vulnerable and dependent on
another because of the need for those services.
Tort and fiduciary law assume that professionals and their clients do
not stand on an equal footing. Professionals have special skill and
knowledge that clients often lack. Clients are usually dependent on
professionals to perform important tasks for them. They cannot easily
specify how professionals should perform these tasks because they
lack the appropriate skills. Clients usually are ill-prepared to monitor
the behavior of professionals and to prevent them from abusing
relationships of trust. Because of the asymmetry of skill and
understanding between professionals and their clients, and because
clients are not very good at monitoring professional conduct, clients
must put themselves in the hands of professionals and trust them to
act in the client's best interest. 41 And given the information that
139 Cf. Post & Shanor, Adam Smith's First Amendment, supra note 127, at 171-72
(noting that expanding the definition of speech to include a wide range of economic
activity would drastically shrink the space of democratic lawmaking).
140 See supra notes 105-19 and accompanying text.
141 See FRANKEL, supra note 106, at xvi, 4, 6, 18, 29 (noting that these asymmetries
are characteristic of most of fiduciary relationships). Thus, many scholars have
derived fiduciary obligations from contract as well as from tort principles. Contractual
theories of fiduciary obligation generally argue that fiduciary duties occur in
exceptional situations because of the nature of the bargaining relationship between the
parties. Courts, in essence, impose the kinds of terms that the parties would have
adopted if there were not significant informational and monitoring costs. Thus,
Easterbrook and Fischel argue, "[A] 'fiduciary' relation is a contractual one
characterized by unusually high costs of specification and monitoring. The duty of
loyalty replaces detailed contractual terms .... " Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 426-27 (1993); see also
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 657-
58 (1995) (arguing that similar considerations apply to trust law, which is essentially
contractual). Roberta Romano has pointed out that asymmetry of information between
the parties is often an important feature of fiduciary relationships and that many
[Vol. 49:11831216
2016] Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment
clients must give professionals, clients' relative lack of knowledge, and
clients' inability to monitor professional behavior and assess risk, it is
especially easy for professionals to abuse that trust. This is the
opposite of the model of independent, autonomous individuals
presupposed by the model of public discourse.
For these reasons, the law does not treat speech in professional or
other fiduciary relationships as part of public discourse; instead, it
treats speech within these relationships as part of ordinary social and
economic activity that is subject to reasonable regulation. The concept
of public discourse creates a distinction between what is "public" and
what is not "public," but it is not the distinction between what is
widely known and what is secret. Rather, it is a distinction between
what kind of speech is connected to the constitutional values behind
the First Amendment - the circulation of ideas and opinions among
the public - and what kind of communication serves other values
and social functions and is therefore properly subject to democratic
regulation.
A good example of how the law characterizes social relations as
falling inside or outside of public discourse is Lowe v. SEC.142 Lowe
upheld the right of people who are not registered as investment
advisors to publish newsletters offering advice about securities to the
general public. t43 Interpreting the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
the Court distinguished between people who offer advice to the
general public and people who offer advice to particular people about
what securities to purchase or sell.144 This distinction tracks the
distinction between public discourse and other kinds of speech. When
people offer advice to the general public, they are not engaged in
individualized advice to clients. They speak to anyone who will listen,
and so we say that they are engaged in public discourse. But when
monitoring problems may be due to information asymmetry. Roberta Romano,
Comment, Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, "Contract and Fiduciary Duty," 36 J.L.
& ECON. 447, 448 (1993).
Romano also points out that a purely contractual approach to fiduciary duty may
not be able to explain a wide range of fiduciary duties that are imposed by statute, and
which do not allow the same degree of flexibility as common-law contract. Id. at 449.
Similarly, Daniel Markovits has pointed out that the fact that fiduciaries enter into
relationships through contract does not mean that their duties are defined by contract.
Many fiduciary relationships limit the ability of parties to modify terms and impose
duties beyond contract. Markovits, supra note 107, at 209-10, 221 (using the example
of marriage).
142 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
143 Id. at 211.
14 Id. at 210-11.
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advisors work with individual clients, the social context is different.
They are not announcing their views to the general public. Instead,
they purport to perform professional services for individual customers.
Therefore Congress may, if it wishes, require them to register as
investment advisors and assume certain duties. 145
Note that the Court did not say that Congress must treat investment
advisors as fiduciaries, much less treat them like doctors or lawyers.
Instead, the Court simply assumed that, consistent with the First
Amendment, Congress may treat investment advisors as fiduciaries or
impose some fiduciary-like obligations on them.146 Because these
investment advisors are not engaged in public discourse, the First
Amendment does not preempt Congress's choice. Congress may
reasonably conclude that investment advisors perform services that
require a certain degree of trust and confidence between themselves
and their clients. But it may also conclude that regulation would be
unwise. Once we characterize speech as falling outside of public
discourse, there is still the further question of what kinds of regulation
are most appropriate.1 47
145 Id. at 210. The Court noted that Congress was "plainly sensitive to First
Amendment concerns" in adopting the Investment Advisers Act, and "wanted to make
clear that it did not seek to regulate the press through the licensing of
nonpersonalized publishing activities." Id. at 204. Hence, while deciding the case on
statutory grounds, the Court invoked First Amendment principles because Congress
"was undoubtedly aware" of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence prior to the
Act. See id. at 204-05 (citing Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Near v.
Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)). Moreover, in determining that the relevant
publications fell within the statutory exclusions to registration under the Act, the
Court noted their factual and general nature and that they were undoubtedly
protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 210 & n.58.
146 Id. at 210.
147 To be sure, there may be First Amendment rights within professional
relationships, but they are based on different kinds of concerns than the protection of
public discourse. For example, in order to fulfill their social function as learned
professionals, doctors must be able to provide truthful information to their patients.
This is a First Amendment right, but it is not a right to engage in public discourse -
after all, it is directed at a patient in a confidential relationship. Rather it stems from
other constitutional values underlying the First Amendment - in particular, a
constitutional interest in the development and faithful application of professional
knowledge. Thus, if the state required doctors to lie to their patients about treatment
options, or required doctors to parrot junk science, there might be a First Amendment
problem, notwithstanding the state's general authority to regulate medical care. See,
e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 939, 986, 989-90 (arguing that the
right to integrity of physician patient relationships is partially protected by the First
Amendment); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 Yale LJ. 1238 (2016)
(arguing that the First Amendment protects the ability to express professional
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In Lowe itself, the Court suggested that ordinary First Amendment
doctrine - including even the ban on prior restraints - would not
apply to communications between investment advisors and their
clients.148 In the Court's words, personalized communications create
special dangers of "fraud, deception, or overreaching" that "are not
replicated in publications that are advertised and sold in an open
market."'149 The Court is not asserting that people do not engage in
false or misleading claims in public discourse - they do so all the
time. Rather, the Court's point is that these speakers are not engaged
in the sort of personalized advice in which fraud, deception and
overreaching create special dangers for vulnerable clients. The Court
therefore distinguished between "impersonal" communications
between newspapers and subscribers and "the kind of fiduciary,
person-to-person relationships ... that are characteristic of investment
adviser-client relationships." 150
Information about clients that is obtained in the course of fiduciary
relationships is not public discourse. Therefore, when a fiduciary
communicates private information about a client to the public, the
communication does not receive standard First Amendment
protection, unless the dependent person - the client - permits the
information to enter public discourse.
This explains why, in my hypothetical, the art exhibit, "Crazy Stuff
My Patients Say," does not receive full First Amendment protection
even though it takes the form of contemporary art. It uses information
obtained in a fiduciary relationship without permission from the
affected patients. Similarly, suppose a lawyer or doctor becomes a
presidential candidate and reveals embarrassing information about
clients to bolster his or her electoral chances. Even though the content
of the speech is political and its purpose is political, the speech is not
immune from regulation, because it is an abuse of a confidential
relationship in which the candidate was an information fiduciary. If
this were not so, then any professional could get around malpractice
law by claiming to be an artist or a politician.
It is important to note that these are special cases. Not everyone that
I deal with is an information fiduciary with respect to me - most
people are not. Suppose that a person illegally obtains my medical
reports and presents them to a reporter. The reporter publishes them
opinions as well as the ability to participate in the production and development of
professional knowledge).
148 See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 204.
149 Id. at 210.
150 Id.
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because the reporter reasonably believes that the information in them
is newsworthy. If the reporter did not obtain the information illegally,
and if the information otherwise involves a matter of public concern,
then, under Bartnicki v. Vopper, the reporter can publish the
information without fear of sanction. 151
The difference in this case is that the reporter and I do not have a
fiduciary relationship. So what the reporter learns lawfully can be
placed in public discourse. On the other hand, I can sue the doctor for
failure to protect my sensitive data, and I can also sue the person who
hacked into my data in the first place. Moreover, the doctor has a
fiduciary duty to make sure that, absent my consent, the doctor does
not disclose this information to anyone except persons and
institutions that apply the same privacy principles that the doctor is
bound by. In other words, the doctor has a fiduciary duty to ensure
that the privacy protections run with the data. The requirement that
privacy protections run with the data means that I do not have to have
a separate contractual agreement with everyone who handles the data.
Rather, it is the fiduciary's job to ensure that my privacy is protected.
The idea of information fiduciaries helps us understand the
limitations of the free speech theories we considered earlier. It
explains why the argument that "commodified data is not speech" is
not the best approach to privacy regulation. The question is not the
form the information takes but how it is obtained and how it is used in
the context of relations of dependence and trust. Commodified data
can easily be part of public discourse and fully protected, for example,
as part of scientific communication, journalism, or art.
Similarly, we can now see why the attempt to treat collections of
personal data as commercial speech is tempting but also wrong.
Characterizing data as commercial speech implicitly recognizes that
the data is somehow not fully public discourse and therefore should
deserve less than full First Amendment protection. But the
characterization misunderstands why the data falls outside of public
discourse. It falls outside of public discourse because it is collected
and used in the context of a special relationship with fiduciary duties.
Generally speaking, you do not have a fiduciary relationship with
advertisers in the media who try to get you to buy their products. But
in certain circumstances, you might have a fiduciary relationship with
online service providers, especially if you must trust and depend on
them, and they, in turn, encourage your trust and dependence.
151 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) ("[A] stranger's illegal
conduct [in obtaining the materiall does not suffice to remove the First Amendment
shield from speech about a matter of public concern.").
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V. INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE
The law of fiduciary relationships developed historically, and the law
has recognized new relationships over time. 152 The digital age, I argue,
has given rise to new fiduciary relationships created by the explosion of
the collection and use of personal data. The relationships of trust
between end-users and online service providers need not be identical to
traditional professional relationships in all respects. Equally
importantly, these relationships may not require the same degree of
obligation, loyalty, and protection that applied to older forms of
professional relationships.
I do not claim that Facebook or Uber is managing my estate, or is
my accountant, my doctor, or my lawyer. What I do claim is that in
the digital age, because we trust them with sensitive information,
certain types of online service providers take on fiduciary
responsibilities. These responsibilities are not identical to those of
older kinds of fiduciaries but have similarities to them. "Just as we
recognized in the past that certain professionals were fiduciaries of our
information," Neil Richards has explained, "so, too, in the Age of
Information should we expand our definition of information
fiduciaries to include bookstores, search engines, ISPs, email
providers, cloud storage services, providers of physical and streamed
video, and websites and social networks when they deal in our
intellectual data."'153
Why should we recognize new classes of information fiduciaries in
the digital age? And why should we call their relationships with end-
users fiduciary relationships? We should do so for the same reason the
law recognized older forms of fiduciary duties in the past.
152 See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 795-96 (1983)
(discussing the rise of new forms of fiduciary obligation in the eighteenth and
twentieth centuries); David J. Seipp, Trust and Fiduciary Duty in the Early Common
Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1011 (2011) (describing the development of fiduciary obligations
in the English common law).
153 NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 168 (2015). Jerry Kang and his colleagues have suggested the creation of
a class of information fiduciaries who collect and store the personal information (e.g.,
locational information) that we generate about ourselves. Jerry Kang et al., Self-
Surveillance Privacy, 97 IowA L. REV. 809, 812, 831-32 (2012). Still earlier, Kenneth
Laudon proposed creating a class of information fiduciaries who would manage our
information assets for us. Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMM. ACM, Sept.
1996, at 92, 101. See generally Richard R.W. Brooks, Knowledge in Fiduciary Relations,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 107, at 225, 240
(comparing the affirmative duties suggested by Laudon with the negative duties
suggested by Richards).
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First, end-users' relationships with many online service providers
involve significant vulnerability, because online service providers have
considerable expertise and knowledge and end-users usually do not.
Online service providers have lots of information about us, and we have
very little information about them or what they can do with the
information they have collected. It is easy for online service providers to
monitor what we do, especially as they collect increasing amounts (and
kinds) of data about us. But it is generally very difficult for us to
monitor their operations and prevent them from acting against our
interests or otherwise betraying our trust.
Second, we find ourselves in a position of relative dependence with
respect to these companies. They provide many different kinds of
services that we need, and we must hope that they will not misuse our
confidences or let loose information about us in ways that will harm us.
Third, in many cases, but not all, online service providers hold
themselves out as experts in providing certain kinds of services in
exchange for our personal information. For example, online dating
services tell us they will match us with potential partners, online
transportation services say they will match us with cars, search
engines purport to give us the information we need quickly and
efficiently, and so on.
Fourth, online service providers know that they hold valuable data
that might be used to our disadvantage - and they know that we
know it too. Therefore, they hold themselves out as trustworthy
organizations who act consistent with our interests, even though they
also hope to turn a profit.154 They present themselves to the public as
responsible and upstanding organizations who will use their power for
lawful ends and, above all, who will not betray us.
Because people understand that they are vulnerable to the collection
of personal data, and because they also recognize that the methods
used by online service providers are beyond their understanding, they
seek reassurance that using these services is safe. Online service
providers are more than happy to offer those assurances, often in
vague and general ways. The details are buried in the fine print of their
privacy policies and in the code of the company's information
infrastructure. 155 The details of these privacy policies may be
154 See, e.g., Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://wwwfacebook.con/
communitystandards (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) ("We want people to feel safe when using
Facebook."); Ten Things We Know To Be True, GOOGLE.CoM, httpsJ/www.google.com/
about/company/philosophy/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) ("You can make money without
doing evil.").
155 See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, Reading the Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year
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technically available to the public, but their meaning and practical
consequences may not be easy to understand, especially as companies
come up with ever new uses and markets for information. And there is
yet another kind of information asymmetry: the code of a company's
information infrastructure and many of its operations are usually kept
secret, often for entirely sensible reasons. Companies hope to preserve
competitive advantage and to ward off security breaches.
By presenting themselves as trustworthy collectors and keepers of
our individual data, and by emphasizing that, for reasons of security
and competitiveness, they cannot be fully transparent, digital
organizations induce relations of trust from us, so that we will
continue to use their services.
I am not blaming companies for trying to make us feel safe in using
their services. Quite the contrary. It is a good thing that companies
attempt to induce trust and confidence, for much the same reason that it
is good that doctors, lawyers, and accountants present themselves as
reliable. In a complex society, people should be encouraged to use the
services of learned professionals. In an even more complex information
society, people should be encouraged to use the many new digital
services that our world has to offer them. Just as a world without
reliable professionals would be impoverished, a world without the
business innovations of the digital age would also be impoverished.
For all of these reasons, we should recognize that a changing society
generates new kinds of fiduciary relations and fiduciary obligations
that the law can and should recognize. The scope of the fiduciary duty,
however, is not the same for every entity. It depends on the nature of
the relationship, the reasonableness of trust, and the importance of
preventing self-dealing by the entity and harm to the end-user, client,
or beneficiary.
Consider, then, a very basic - and necessarily vague - formulation:
People and business entities act as information fiduciaries
(1) when these people or entities hold themselves out to the
public as privacy-respecting organizations in order to gain the
trust of those who use them;
(2) when these people or entities give individuals reason to
believe that they will not disclose or misuse their personal
information; and
Would Take 76 Work Days, AIANr c (Mar. 1, 2012), httpY/www.theatlantic.corn/
technology/archive/2012/03/reading-the-privacy-policies-you-encounter-in-a-year-would-
take-76-work-days/253851/ ("The collective weight of the web's data collection practices is
so great that no one can maintain a responsible relationship with his or her own data.").
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(3) when the affected individuals reasonably believe that
these people or entities will not disclose or misuse their
personal information based on existing social norms of
reasonable behavior, existing patterns of practice, or other
objective factors that reasonably justify their trust.156
Note that this formulation may require information fiduciaries to
protect more things than they have explicitly set out in their privacy
policies. Obviously, organizations should be held accountable for
violating their own privacy policies. But privacy policies may be
intentionally vague, and they may not give fair warning of how the
company will later use data. The proper question should be what
forms of trust companies have induced in order to get people to use
their services and what people may reasonably expect will be done
with their data.
Perhaps the best way of summarizing the idea of information
fiduciaries in the digital age is that online service providers may not
act like con men. The term "con man" is short for "confidence man,"
and the point of a "con game" (or "confidence game") is to gain the
trust and confidence of a mark in order to act against their interests
later on.157 The idea of a con game is just the mirror image of the idea
of a fiduciary duty: if you induce another to treat you with confidence,
you cannot turn around and betray that confidence.
Online service providers act like con men when they assure people
that they will treat them fairly in order to obtain their business - and
their data - and then betray them. In confidence games, betrayal may
occur in wholly unexpected ways; indeed, if the mark saw the betrayal
coming, they would not fall for it. We might make a similar point
about the potential dangers of the digital world. Digital businesses are
supposed to be creative; that is how they succeed. Yet, one side effect
of being creative means that businesses will probably come up with
ever new ways to use personal data, and therefore ever new ways to
betray their end-users. The point of treating them as information
fiduciaries is to encourage creativity without facilitating betrayal.
At a minimum, when entities hold themselves out as trustworthy,
and when they encourage the disclosure of personal information that
156 See RESTATEMENT OF DATA PRIVACY PRINCIPLES § 5.2 (Preliminary Draft No. 2,
Oct. 24, 2014) (offering a similar test of confidentiality for "[rlelationships of trust").
157 See M. ALLEN HENDERSON, FLIM-FLAM MAN: How CON GAMES WORK 3 (1985)
("As the term implies, the confidence artist gains the confidence of his victim in order
to defraud him."); LIONEL S. LEWIS, CON GAME: BERNARD MADOFF AND His VICTIMS 2-3
(2012) ("What all con games have in common is that they attempt to victimize.., by
gaining the confidence of marks or victims.").
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places end-users in a vulnerable position, entities should be held
accountable for their representations. But the notion of information
fiduciaries goes beyond explicit promises. Digital information
fiduciaries may be held to reasonable ethical standards of trust and
confidentiality, even if they do not make specific representations,
because of the nature and kind of business they are in. In the same
way, even if your doctor or lawyer does not explicitly promise
confidentiality and good behavior, they are still information
fiduciaries, and governments may impose legal obligations on them as
such. It also follows that reasonable obligations placed on information
fiduciaries do not violate the First Amendment, even if these
regulations limit the ability to collect, analyze, use, sell, or disclose
some kinds of end-user information.
These rules do not apply to everyone. Merely communicating with
someone over the Internet does not make them an information
fiduciary. That is why many collection, use, and disclosure practices
will remain protected by the First Amendment.
VI. THE SCOPE OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
By suggesting that online service providers are information
fiduciaries, I have been analogizing these companies to traditional
professional fiduciaries like doctors or lawyers. This is analogy,
however, and not an identity. Moreover, even within traditional
examples, there is no single class of fiduciary duties that apply equally
in all situations. The duties that courts impose depend on the nature
of the relationships involved. 58 In the next part of this essay, I want to
discuss important differences between the duties of digital information
fiduciaries like Uber, Facebook, and Google, and traditional fiduciaries
like doctors, lawyers, accountants, and managers of estates. The duties
that we impose on traditional fiduciaries can be fairly extensive; but
the duties we might justifiably impose on online service providers may
be different and sometimes considerably narrower, especially if we
want these duties to be consistent with the First Amendment.
Fiduciary duties or duties of confidentiality for doctors and lawyers
are often quite broad and strong; they may be greater than we would
158 See FRANKEL, supra note 106, at 53 (noting that "[tihe process of recognizing
new fiduciary relationships is ongoing," depending on the nature of their services, the
power relations and temptations they create, and the ability of institutions and
markets to control them); Frankel, supra note 152, at 810 ("Fiduciary relations vary
by the extent to which each type of fiduciary can abuse his power to the detriment of
the entrustor.").
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reasonably expect of online service providers and related digital
enterprises. We normally expect that doctors and lawyers will not say
anything that harms their clients or creates a conflict of interest, and
we expect these professionals to look out for our interests in many
different ways. But people do not expect the same degree of concern
from online service providers. Treating them as information
fiduciaries is designed to keep these companies from harming end-
users in a more limited set of ways.
There are good reasons for this. In most cases, people reward
fiduciaries financially for the additional duties they take on. It is also
important to organize payment so that it does not create a conflict of
interest with the client; otherwise, the fiduciary's loyalties are divided
between the client and the entity or organization providing funding. In
the health care context, the institution of insurance perpetually raises
this problem.
When we are dealing with online service providers like Facebook or
Google, the most important source of compensation is personal
information. For many online companies, the product or service is
either free or heavily subsidized because it generates data, which is
valuable to the company or to third parties to which the company sells
the data.
All other things being equal, companies like Facebook or Google
would like to maximize the value of the personal data they collect.
And certainly if such a company goes bankrupt or is later sold, its
collection of end-user data is one of its most valuable assets. The value
of end-user data, and its centrality in the business models of many
online service providers, creates an inherent potential for conflicts of
interest between the digital company and the end-user.
We cannot rely on market forces alone to solve these conflict of
interest problems. The market will work to some extent: markets may
punish companies with bad reputations for mistreating their end-
users. But there is no guarantee that this will be enough to effectively
police all forms of misbehavior.
There are strong asymmetries of information between companies
and end users. Online service providers' operations, algorithms, and
collection practices are mostly kept secret - often for perfectly good
reasons - because companies want to prevent free-riding from
competitors and mischief from hackers. Even to the extent that
companies' information practices are publicly available, end-users are
not in a very good position to assess how well companies will protect
their interests or to decide which company will treat them best in the
long run. Nor can end-users easily predict how their data will be
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collated, analyzed, and used in ways that affect their opportunities and
interests. In many cases, end-users are largely dependent on the good
will of these companies not to abuse their personal information.
Thus, online service providers present the familiar problems that
generally give rise to fiduciary obligations. First, there are significant
asymmetries of knowledge and information between online service
providers and end-users. Second, it is very difficult for end-users to
verify online companies' representations about data collection,
security, use, and dissemination. Third, it is very difficult for end-
users to understand what online companies do with their data and
how data analysis and use affects their interests. Fourth, even if end-
users understood these information practices, it would be almost
impossible for end-users to monitor them.
All of these problems are connected to the inadequacy of relying on
contract and property models to protect privacy and prevent
overreaching. They are reasons for imposing some sort of fiduciary
obligation on online service providers.
Nevertheless, if we impose fiduciary obligations that are too broad,
it might follow that online service providers could not make any
money at all from this data because the data might be used in some
way to some end-user's disadvantage.
This is clearly too strong a claim. It cannot be the case that the basic
business model of free or subsidized online services inherently violates
fiduciary obligations and therefore can be made illegal. "Fiduciary"
does not mean "not for profit." At the same time, consumers should be
able to trust online service providers like Facebook, Uber, or Google
not to abuse their ability to collect and use personal information for
profit. An online business model should still be compatible with a
range of fiduciary obligations.
It should be reasonable to expect that a transportation broker or an
online dating service will not attempt or threaten to embarrass you to
keep you from criticizing it. It is also reasonable to expect that a social
networking service is designed to facilitate social networking and not
to manipulate you into voting for the candidate of its choice because it
wants to rig an election.
Because personal data is a key source of wealth in the digital
economy, information fiduciaries should be able to monetize some
uses of personal data, and our reasonable expectations of trust must
factor that expectation into account. What information fiduciaries may
not do is use the data in unexpected ways to the disadvantage of
people who use their services or in ways that violate some other
important social norm.
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We might make an analogy to financial advisors. We expect that
financial advisors will make money from us when we ask them for
advice about investments. We might allow a variety of different
methods of compensation; advisors might be permitted to charge a
small percentage of assets per year, or they might be permitted to
charge us a small fee each time they ask for our advice. Even so, the
fact that advisors make money from clients does not mean that we
cannot impose any fiduciary obligations on them.159 At the very least,
governments should be able to require that investment advisors will be
working for us and not for the mutual fund companies or financial
institutions whose products they sell. Government may decide that
financial advisors should not be beholden to other parties to avoid
creating incentives to sell us products with hidden costs or high fees.
There is a second important difference between traditional
fiduciaries and online service providers. Sometimes we expect that
professionals will not only avoid actively harming clients but also look
out for the interests of clients and keep them from harming themselves
or doing foolish things.160 Doctors, for example, present themselves as
learned professionals concerned with our health; therefore, it is
reasonable to expect them to warn patients about many kinds of
health risks and not just to avoid incompetently treating the particular
disease or condition that brings a patient to the doctor.
We might not want to impose comprehensive obligations of care on
digital companies like Google, Facebook, or Uber. Their businesses are
quite different from those of doctors, and they do not hold themselves
out as taking care of end-users in general. The nature of their duties
depends on the kind of business they present to the public. Google
and Uber may have a duty to protect our privacy in certain ways, but
we do not expect them to warn us not to go on a particular trip.
Facebook presents itself as helping us to connect with other people.
But we should not expect that Facebook has a fiduciary duty to warn
us not to look up that long-lost college buddy who, it turns out, is a
very dangerous person. Nor should we expect that Facebook has a
159 For example, the Obama Administration has recently proposed new rules
imposing fiduciary obligations on a larger class of investment advisors. JOHN J.
TOPOLESKI & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44207, DEP'T OF LABOR'S 2015
PROPOSED FIDUCIARY RULE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES (2015), available at
https://www.fas.orgsgp/crs/misc/R44207.pdf; cf. FRANKEL, supra note 106, at 45-47
(describing current debates over the fiduciary status of securities brokers).
160 Cf. Richard R.W. Brooks, Knowledge in Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 107, at 225, 240 ("Fiduciaries ... have
not only duties of confidentiality and disclosure, but also duties to inquire, to inform,
land] to speak with candor ... ").
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duty to keep us from receiving links from our Facebook friends that
are misleading or emotionally disturbing. In these contexts, their duty
to protect us is quite limited.
Third, digital companies like Facebook or Google may have an
interest in getting people to express themselves as much as possible,
thus creating links and content that can be indexed or shared with
others. Social media companies may have an interest in getting people
to disclose a lot about themselves. It is certainly possible that people
may later regret how much they have disclosed. Although at some
point that interest in promoting disclosure and production of content
may create a conflict of interest between companies and end-users, we
should not assume that online service providers have a positive
obligation to stop asking people to reveal more of themselves in social
media. Companies should have an obligation to facilitate end-users'
control over their information and to explain the consequences of
privacy settings, but not to prevent people from making every kind of
bad choice in how they use social media.
We should think of these kinds of online service providers, in short,
as special-purpose information fiduciaries. The nature of their services
should guide our judgments about what kinds of duties it is
reasonable to impose. We should connect the kinds of duties that
information fiduciaries have to the kinds of services they provide.
What is unexpected or seems like a breach of trust will depend on the
kind of service that entities provide and what we would reasonably
consider unexpected or abusive for them to do.
Because there are so many possible online services, including
services nobody has yet imagined, legislatures and courts may find it
difficult to draw lines initially. We might use tax breaks, safe harbors,
legal immunities, or other incentives for organizations to accept
fiduciary obligations rather than simply imposing them directly
through government regulation. Therefore, as Jonathan Zittrain has
suggested, it might be appropriate to offer online service providers an
incentive to designate themselves as information fiduciaries in return
for certain legal and financial benefits that come with the
designation. 161
Several years ago, Edward Castronova suggested that we might
govern virtual worlds through what he called statutes of interration (a
play on statutes of incorporation).1 62 I adapted this idea in my own
161 Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election, supra note 11.
162 Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 185, 201-02
(2004).
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work on virtual worlds. 163 I have argued that even though virtual
environments are privately owned, governments could create
framework statutes that would require platform owners to respect the
free speech and privacy rights of end users in return for special legal
status and benefits.164 We might be able to adapt this idea to today's
online service providers to create new classes of digital information
fiduciaries.
VII. INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
So far, I have discussed the relationship of information fiduciaries to
the First Amendment. When I first wrote about the idea of
information fiduciaries, however, I noted that it also might change the
way we think about Fourth Amendment law. 165 As currently
interpreted, the third-party doctrine holds that government does not
have to obtain a warrant to obtain digital information about us that we
have given to a third party. 166 This means that we have little or no
Fourth Amendment protection when the government wants to obtain
information collected about us that is in the hands of a social media
site, ISP, or other online business. The law assumes that if we have
consented to give this information to a third party, or have allowed a
third party to collect it about us, we take the risk that the third party
will disclose this information to the government. Therefore, we have
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. 167
The argument of this essay shows why that assumption is mistaken.
We provide lots of information about ourselves - some of it quite
sensitive - to people and organizations who owe us fiduciary duties
or duties of confidentiality. And when we provide this information, we
have, and should have, a reasonable expectation that they will respect
our privacy. We have a reasonable expectation that disclosing this
163 See Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in
Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2090-98 (2004) (arguing for framework statutes
to protect free speech and privacy in certain kinds of multi-user online environments).
164 Id. at 2092-95.
165 See Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 4.
166 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561,
563 (2009).
167 See id. at 588-90; see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-45 (1979)
(arguing that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers
they dial because they are available to phone companies; therefore "petitioner
assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed");
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) ("The depositor takes the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person
to the Government." (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971))).
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information to them, or allowing them to collect it from us, is not the
same as making the information available to the public generally. We
have a reasonable expectation, in other words, that people and
organizations who owe duties of trust and confidence to us will not
betray us. Indeed, the law creates and recognizes relationships of trust
and confidence precisely because it wants people to have reasonable
expectations of privacy in certain relationships.
If I am right that new digital online service providers may be new
kinds of information fiduciaries, then we should have reasonable
expectations of privacy in at least some of the information about
ourselves that we share with them. The reasons why this information
is not public discourse for purposes of the First Amendment also
provide reasons why we should have a reasonable expectation of
privacy for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
This conclusion does not mean that the government may not obtain
the information at all. The government may still use warrants upon a
showing of probable cause. Or the information may fall under one of
the exceptions to the warrant requirement. 168 The point, however, is
that if we give information to an information fiduciary, the third-party
doctrine should ordinarily not apply, and the information should not
fall outside of the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Note, moreover, that this would not be the end of the third-party
doctrine. It would still continue to apply in all cases in which we
provide information to someone who is not an information fiduciary.
In fact, the concept of information fiduciaries is especially helpful
because it gives us an intermediate position between enforcing the
third-party doctrine as it currently stands and getting rid of it entirely.
Recently, Kiel Brennan-Marquez has taken up this project.169 He
points out that current Fourth Amendment doctrine often takes
fiduciary-style relationships into account, although it does not map
precisely onto the distinction between information fiduciaries and
non-fiduciaries that I am drawing here.170 Nevertheless, there is
enough of an overlap that the doctrine could usefully move in this
direction without too much disruption.
168 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (exception to warrant
requirement for search incident to lawful arrest); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (exceptions based on special needs).
169 Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611,
611 (2015).
170 Id. at 649-57.
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VIII. INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES IN THE ALGORITHMIC SOCIETY
The theory of information fiduciaries does not solve all privacy
problems. It does not deal with false light or the intentional infliction
of emotional distress. It does not illuminate, much less solve, all
problems of government invasion of privacy. Nevertheless, the theory
of information fiduciaries allows us to understand how First
Amendment guarantees of free speech can co-exist with regulatory
solutions to a common set of problems created by the proliferation of
data and uses of data in the digital age.
The key examples in my discussion so far have been online service
providers - social media companies like Facebook, search engines
like Google, and service platforms like Uber. But companies are
increasingly using sophisticated algorithms and forms of artificial
intelligence to make decisions about people in areas ranging from
advertising to employment to policing to credit.' 71 The Digital Society
has become the Algorithmic Society.
The analysis I have just offered does not change if a company uses
algorithms or artificial intelligence agents to harm or otherwise abuse
the trust of its end-users. If a company is an information fiduciary, it has
duties not to use the information it collects against its end-users in the
ways described above. If it is inappropriate for a company to try to use
collections of personal data to embarrass or manipulate end-users, the
fact that it uses artificial intelligence or algorithms to do so hardly
matters. Indeed, the fact that companies have increasingly powerful
algorithms and artificial intelligence agents at their disposal means only
that they have ever more power over their end-users, and therefore a
greater responsibility to exercise appropriate care and loyalty.
The more interesting problem arises when algorithms use data about
other people (or about large populations) in order to make predictions
about users, and users have no relationship of trust or confidence with
the enterprise that uses the algorithm. Examples are situations in
171 See, e.g., Nate Berg, Predicting Crime, LAPD-Style, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2014, 5:19
EDT), http//www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/j un/25/predicting-crime-lapd-los-angeles-
police-data-analysis-algorithm-minority-report (discussing police departments' use of
algorithms to identify areas with high probabilities for certain types of crime); Natasha
Singer, Whether Working or Job Seeking, the Algorithm Is Watching, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 28,
2014, 5:20 PM), http:/bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/whether-working-or-job-
seeking-the-algorithm-is-watching/ (discussing companies' use of algorithms to monitor
and rank both employees and job seekers). See generally, FRANK PASQuALE, THE BLACK BOX
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGoRITHms THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015)
(discussing the role of algorithms in finance, search, advertising, and employment).
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which we apply for credit; 72 or seek employment, housing, or
business opportunities. 173 Companies will use algorithms and artificial
intelligence to try to predict people's behavior in advance. 174 Their
construction of social spaces and social opportunities will affect more
than their base of end-users and clients.
When we are the end-user, client or customer of such a company,
the problem of discrimination and manipulation arises out of an abuse
of trust in the use of our personal information. But when we are not an
end-user, client, or customer, there is no violation of a special
relationship. Rather, the concern is about discrimination and
manipulation that has effects on society in general. The Facebook
story that begins this essay offers an example. 175 If a social media
company attempted to swing a national election by manipulating its
end-users, it would affect everyone in the population whether or not
they used the service.
That is why the analysis I have offered in this essay can only take us
so far. The concept of information fiduciaries presented here focuses
on the violations of special relationships between companies and the
people whose information they collect, collate, and use. To the extent
that these companies take on fiduciary duties, they may also have
duties to ensure that, when they sell or convey this information to
others, duties of non-disclosure and non-manipulation travel with the
data. But in the Algorithmic Society, companies will purchase and use
lots of data that is not so encumbered, and they will use it to affect the
lives of countless people who are not their clients or end-users.
At this point, we can no longer rely on the notion of special
fiduciary relationships between individuals and companies to regulate
the use and abuse of data. Instead, we must ask what duties of good
172 See, e.g., Amir E. Khandani, Adlar J. Kim & Andrew W. Lo, Consumer Credit
Risk Models via Machine-Learning Algorithms 2 (May 9, 2010), available at
https://mitsloan.mit.edu/media/Lo-ConsumerCreditRiskModels.pdf (describing an
algorithm to predict consumer spending).
173 See, e.g., Tim Adams, Job Hunting Is a Matter of Big Data, Not How You Perform at an
Interview, GuARDIAN (May 10, 2014, 4:00 EDT), httpJ/www.theguardian.com/
technology/2014/may/10/job-hunting-big-data-interview-algorithns-employees (describing
"[tlhe advance of algorithms into recruitment and 'talent management'"); Rachel Emma
Silverman & Nikki Waller, The Algorithm That Tells the Boss Who Might Quit, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 13, 2015, 7:05 PM ET), httpJ/www.wsj.com/articles/the-algorithm-that-tells-the-
boss-who-might-quit-1426287935 (describing use of algorithms by Wal-Mart and Credit
Suisse to decide which employees are likely to leave or stay).
174 See, e.g., Larry Hardesty, Automating Big-Data Analysis, MIT NEws (Oct. 16, 2015),
http//news.mit.edu/2015/automating-big-data-analysis-1016 (describing algorithms that
predict human behavior better than experts).
175 See supra Part 11.
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faith and ethical conduct in the collection, analysis, use, sale and
distribution of data are owed to the members of society as a whole.176
That is, our focus will shift from duties of confidentiality and loyalty
to particular end-users to obligations of trustworthiness and fair play
with respect to the general public. As we move from the world of the
Internet to the Algorithmic Society, the horizons of our concern must
expand accordingly.
176 Cf. FRANKEL, supra note 106, at 3, 159-60, 167 (noting the possibility that
courts may consider the needs of the public in articulating fiduciary duties between
parties).
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